H5N1 virion. Photo Cynthia Goldsmith/Jackie Katz |
Two years
ago, a controversy emerged about the research on influenza virus H5N1, and the
potential risk associated with it. This controversy followed the publication of
two research articles in Science and Nature, and I wrote about it in January
2012 in this blog post. Briefly, scientists have used so-called “gain-of-functions”
experiments, in which strains of influenza viruses are selected for new traits
such as higher transmissibility between ferrets (the preferred animal model in these studies). The objections that were raised by some critics
of this research were of two kinds: first, the information available in these
papers could be used by terrorists in order to produce bioweapons; second,
modified influenza viruses could escape the lab by accident and create a
pandemic. The first objection led to a very rare decision in scientific
publishing, namely the redaction of the articles to remove potentially
sensitive data. The important public concern also led the authors of these
studies to promulgate a moratorium on this type of work. After this temporary
stop, the experiments started again with additional biosafety measures.
The debate,
however, is far from over. The reason for this? Well, the recent publications
of several studies dealing with influenza virus, most notably a paper by Y.
Kawaoka (the author of the 2012 Nature publication) on avian influenza viruses
related to the 1918 “Spanish flu” virus. This research triggered a heated
response from several scientists, which was loudly echoed in the mainstream
press (see for instance in the Guardian and in the Independent). In that
particular case, it seems that the scientific community is truly divided on
the matter. An example of this dissent was the publication of a statement of
concern by a group of scientists known as the Cambridge Working Group,
which in essence asked for a better assessment of the risks of virus
research via the organization of a conference that would deal with all present
issues. Such a meeting could resemble the famous Asilomar conference of 1975,
where the risks associated with recombinant DNA were debated. Other
virologists, however, have fought back these reactions of distrust and have
created another group, Scientists for Science, which aims at promoting the
benefits of this research, and highlight the fact that serious safety regulations are already in place for virus research.